Real Exchange Rate Targeting and Macroeconomic Instability by Martin Uribe
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









I would like to thank for comments Caroline Betts, David Bowman, Guillermo Calvo, Stephanie Schmitt-
Grohé, and seminar participants at UCLA, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 1995
meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control held in Barcelona, the 1995 meeting of the Allied
Social Sciences Association held in Washington, DC, and the conference Indeterminacy and Sunspots
in Macroeconomics held at New York University in November 1997.  The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Martín Uribe.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Real Exchange Rate Targeting and Macroeconomic Instability
Martín Uribe




Using an optimizing model of a small open economy, this paper studies the macroeconomic
effects of PPP rules whereby the government increases the devaluation rate when the real exchange
rate—defined as the price of tradables in terms of nontradables— is below its long-run level and
reduces the devaluation rate when the real exchange rate is above its long-run level. The paper
shows that the mere existence of such a rule can generate aggregate fluctuations due to self-fulfilling
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In developing countries, policymakers often link the rate of devaluation of the domestic
currency to the level of the real exchange rate with the intention of maintaining a desired level
of competitiveness in foreign markets. Devaluations often take place when the real exchange
rate is overvalued, that is, when the relative price of tradables in terms of nontradables is
low relative to a target or trend level. Empirical support for this observation is robust.
Klein and Marion (1997), for example, analyze 61 episodes of exchange rate management
drawn from 16 Latin American countries and Jamaica. They ﬁnd strong evidence that a
more appreciated real exchange rate is associated with a higher likelihood of a devaluation.
Similar relationships have been found by Frankel and Rose (1996) and by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) for a large number of developing countries. Calvo, Reinhart, and V´ egh
(1995) review the empirical literature on real exchange rate targeting and conclude that the
real exchange rate is perhaps the most popular real target in developing countries.
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically study the macroeconomic eﬀects of exchange-
rate rules whereby the government increases the devaluation rate when the real exchange
rate is below its long-run level and decreases it when the real exchange rate is above its
long-run level. We refer to this type of rule as purchasing-power-parity (PPP) rules. In
particular, the paper focuses on the question of whether the mere adherence to a PPP rule
can generate endogenous aggregate instability by allowing for the existence of equilibria in
which non-fundamental signals aﬀect the course of the economy. The central result of this
investigation is that tight PPP rules can generate indeterminacy of the rational expectations
equilibrium and endogenous ﬂuctuations due to arbitrary revisions in expectations. Thus,
PPP rules can give rise to situations in which exchange rate instability, both nominal and
real, occurs simply because the public expect it. This instability is shown to be welfare
decreasing.
We begin by formalizing this idea in a simple perfect-foresight, ﬂexible-price environment.
We embed a PPP rule in a model of a small open, monetary economy in which the use of
1money is motivated by assuming that it facilitates transactions ` al aKimbrough (1986). The
key to understanding the intuition behind our indeterminacy result lies in the relationship
between the current level of the real exchange rate and expected devaluations implied by
the model. In a small open economy, the nominal interest rate is, loosely speaking, an
increasing function of the expected devaluation rate. Hence, an increase in next period’s
expected devaluation rate causes an increase in the domestic interest rate in the current
period. In response to an increase in the nominal interest rate, agents reduce their demand
for real money balances. A lower demand for money, in turn, pushes transaction costs up
and induces agents to reduce their current consumption expenditure. Given the supply of
nontradables, this decline in aggregate consumption puts downward pressure on the relative
price of nontradables, that is, it generates a real depreciation of the domestic currency. Thus,
expectations of higher future devaluation rates are associated with current real exchange rate
depreciation. Consider now a negatively serially correlated sunspot variable and assume that
economic agents associate high values of the sunspot variable with high current devaluation
rates and low values of the sunspot variable with low current devaluation rates. Then a
high realization of the sunspot variable today induces people to believe that next period’s
devaluation rate will be small, generating, by the mechanism described above, a decrease in
the current real exchange rate. By the PPP rule, the government is then induced to devalue
the domestic currency in the current period. If the PPP rule is sensitive enough, the current
deviation of the devaluation rate from its steady-state level will be larger, in absolute value,
than the one expected for next period, making the expectations about the future devaluation
rate self-fulﬁlling.
The perfect-foresight, ﬂexible-price model is a simple vehicle to convey the idea that real
exchange rate targeting can have unintended consequences. However, that simple theoreti-
cal environment abstracts from two important elements that characterize and motivate the
use of PPP rules. First, in reality even governments that explicitly state their intention to
target a desired level of real competitiveness do not follow deterministic exchange rate rules.
2In particular, not every episode of real overvaluation is followed by a depreciation of the
domestic currency. Our next step is therefore to augment the basic framework to allow for
stochastic PPP rules. Under this type of rule, deviations of the real exchange rate from its
target level induce a corrective nominal exchange rate movement with a certain probability.
Just as in the case of deterministic PPP rules, stochastic rules can induce endogenous insta-
bility. The case of stochastic rules is of interest because it shows that external crises can be
policy induced even if the nominal exchange rate remains stable throughout the crisis. The
key element causing aggregate instability is agents’ perception that the government might
intervene in the event of a worsening of competitiveness.
A second unrealistic element of the benchmark framework is the assumption that prices
are ﬂexible. After all, the main motivation for the introduction of exchange rate rules is
that in the presence of nominal rigidities ﬁxed exchange rates introduce real rigidity. Any
shock that calls for a movement in the equilibrium real exchange rate induce, in the absence
of accommodating exchange rate policies, ineﬃcient adjustment in output and employment.
To address this issue, we develop a model with sticky prices ` al aRotemberg (1982). We
ﬁnd that, as in the case of ﬂexible prices, the introduction of a PPP rule opens the door to
aggregate ﬂuctuations driven solely by self-fulﬁlling expectations.
Our central result suggests a policy tradeoﬀ. On the one hand, in a world where nominal
rigidities are signiﬁcant, a PPP rule might introduce the necessary real ﬂexibility to cope
with intrinsic (fundamental) uncertainty. On the other hand, tight PPP rules can give rise
to aggregate ﬂuctuations driven by extrinsic (non-fundamental) uncertainty.
Thus far, the theoretical literature on real exchange rate targeting has focused on the
ﬁrst part of the tradeoﬀ described above. That is, on the role of PPP rules as absorbers
of fundamental shocks. For example, Dornbusch (1982) studies PPP rules in a Mundell-
Fleming model of a small open economy with sticky wages ` al aTaylor. In his model,
movements in the real exchange rate aﬀect prices and aggregate quantities through both the
demand channel (by altering net exports), and the supply channel (by changing the cost of
3tradable inputs). Dornbusch shows that when this model is hit by supply shocks, PPP rules
increase the volatility of output if the supply channel dominates and reduces it if the demand
channel dominates. Price volatility, on the other hand, always increases with tighter PPP
rules. More recently, Calvo et al. . (1995) use a continuous time, cash-in-advance model to
show that the government can generate a more depreciated real exchange rate by generating
a temporary increase in the devaluation rate. However, they show that the resulting gain in
competitiveness is also transitory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 derives the central indeterminacy result. As a byproduct, this section presents a
technical result that can be of use more generally. Speciﬁcally, it develops a technique for
establishing determinacy in non-hyperbolic model, that is, models whose equilibrium law of
motion contains a unit root. In this class of model, the usual technique to characterize local
determinacy, consisting in linearizing around a steady state and studying the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix is not valid. Section 4 analyzes stochastic PPP rules. Section 5 studies
the consequences of real exchange rate targeting in the presence of sluggish price adjustment.
Section 6 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
This section embeds a simple PPP rule of the type analyzed in Dornbusch (1982) in a
standard optimizing monetary model of a small open economy.
2.1 The PPP rule
Let et denote the real exchange rate in period t, deﬁned as the price of tradables in terms
of nontradables. Speciﬁcally, letting P T
t and P N
t denote, respectively, the domestic nominal
prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, then the real exchange rate is given by et =
P T
t /P N
t . Throughout the paper, we assume that the law of one price holds for tradables.
4That is, that P T
t = EtP T∗
t ,w h e r eEt denotes the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the price
of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, and P T∗
t denotes the international price of
tradables. Furthermore, we assume that the foreign-currency price of tradables is constant
and normalized to one. These two assumptions imply that the price of one unit of the traded
good in terms of domestic currency is always equal to the nominal exchange rate, or P T
t = Et.
Let  t ≡E t/Et−1 −1 denote the devaluation rate in period t. The PPP rule is then assumed
to be given by
 t = f(et); f
  ≤ 0, (1)
where f is a continuously diﬀerentiable, non-increasing function. According to this rule, the
government increases the rate of devaluation when the real exchange rate appreciates and
reduces the devaluation rate when the real exchange rate depreciates.
2.2 Households
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely-lived
consumers with preferences deﬁned over sequences of consumption of tradables, cT
t ,a n d
nontradables, cN









where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the subjective discount factor, and U(·,·) denotes the single-period
utility function, which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable.
Households have access to two types of ﬁnancial asset, ﬁat money and an internationally
traded bond. This bond is denominated in foreign currency pays the exogenous and constant
interest rate r in terms of tradables. To avoid inessential long-run dynamics we assume that
5r satisﬁes
β(1 + r)=1 .
As in Kimbrough (1986), money is assumed to reduce transaction costs in goods markets.






t and xt denote, respectively, real money balances and consumption expenditure in








In turn, real money holdings are given by md
t = Md
t /P T
t ,w h e r eMd
t denotes the demand for
nominal money balances. The transaction cost function v(·,·) is assumed to be increasing
in its ﬁrst argument, decreasing in its second argument, convex, and homogeneous of degree
one.1 It follows that vxm < 0. As will become clear shortly, the homogeneity and convexity
assumptions imply that the household’s demand for real balances is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate and unit elastic with respect to expenditure.
The consumer starts each period with some ﬁnancial assets carried over from the previous
period and is endowed with constant amounts of traded and nontraded goods, yT and yN.
The household’s period-by-period budget constraint, expressed in terms of tradables, is then
1These restrictions on the form of the transaction cost technology are commonplace both in open and
closed economy models (see, for example, Rebelo and V´ egh, 1995; Reinhart and V´ egh, 1995; and the discus-
















t + xt + st − τt,
where dc
t denotes the stock of private debt in period t,a n dτt is a lump-sum transfer received
from the government. The consumer is also assumed to be subject to the following borrowing





(1 + r)t ≤ 0.
































(1 + r)t =0 , (7)
where Uj, j = T,N denotes the marginal utility of good j,a n dit denotes the domestic
nominal interest rate. We assume that the country enjoys perfect capital mobility. Then,
under perfect foresight uncovered interest parity must hold
1+it =( 1+r)(1 +  t+1). (8)
7The interpretation of the household’s optimality conditions is straightforward. Condition (4)
is an Euler equation showing how the presence of transaction costs aﬀects the intertemporal
price of consumption. For example, all other things equal, when the marginal transaction cost
vx(x,m) is expected to increase over time, consumption tends to display a decreasing pattern.
Equation (5) states that agents allocate their expenditure to tradables and non-tradables
in such a way that the marginal rate of substitution between these two types of goods
equals the real exchange rate. As tradables become more expensive relative to nontradables
(i.e., as et increases) households consume relatively more nontradables and less tradables.
Condition (6) is a money demand equation. Because v(x,m) is assumed to be homogeneous
of degree one, we have that vm(x,m) is homogeneous of degree zero. It then follows that
real balances are unit elastic with respect to total expenditure, xt. This implication is in
line with money demand estimates in developing countries, as documented, for example, by
Arrau et al. (1995), Reinhart and V´ egh (1995), and Mendoza and Uribe (2000).2 Note that
the demand for money implicit in equation (6) is decreasing in the nominal interest rate if
and only if vmx < 0. This condition is satisﬁed given our maintained assumptions of linear
homogeneity and convexity of the function v(·,·).3 Thus, we can rewrite equation (6) as
m
d
t = xt (it), (9)
where  (·) is strictly decreasing. Finally, equation (7) is a transversality condition stating
that private debt must converge to zero in present discounted value.
2Arrau et al. (1995) estimate money demand functions for ten developing countries. They report an
average income elasticity of 1.06 over seven countries for which a cointegrating relationship was found (see
table 4). Reinhart and V´ egh (1995) estimate money demand functions for Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay
and ﬁnd an average consumption elasticity of 1.2.
3A negative interest elasticity of money demand is strongly supported by the data (see Reinhart and
V´ egh, 1995; and Arrau et al., 1995). We note, however, that in the presence of currency substitution, a
phenomenon that is prevalent in high-inﬂation economies, there is no guarantee that the money demand
function is invariant to alternative policy speciﬁcations (see, for instance, Uribe (1997).
82.3 The government

















(1 + r)t =0 , (11)
where d
g
t denotes the stock of public debt and ms
t the money supply in t, both expressed
in terms of tradables. The real money supply is given by ms
t = Ms
t /P T
t ,w h e r eMs
t denotes
the nominal supply of money. As in the case of the household, the government is subject
to a borrowing constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi games. Monetary policy
is given by the PPP rule (1). Fiscal policy consists of an endogenous sequence of lump-
sum transfers {τt}∞
t=0 that guarantees that the government’s transversality condition (11) is
satisﬁed under all circumstances.
2.4 Market-clearing conditions











We ignore the wealth eﬀects associated with inﬂation by assuming that the transaction cost,
st, is rebated to the representative household in a lump-sum fashion.4 This assumption,
4One can think of st as representing pure proﬁts of ﬁnancial institutions owned by households.
9together with the two market-clearing conditions and the budget constraints of the household




evolves according to the following expression










(1 + r)t = a0, (14)
where a0 ≡ (1 + r)(yT/r − d−1) denotes the country’s wealth in period zero. Combining
equations (4), (8), (9), and (12) and taking into account that vx(x,m) is homogeneous of









where h( ) ≡ 1+vx(1, ((1+r)(1+ )−1) is strictly increasing in  . Equations (5) and (12)
together with the assumed strict concavity of the single-period utility function imply that the





  < 0 (16)
We are now ready to provide a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences {cT
t ,e t,  t}∞
t=0 satisfying (1),
(14), (15), and (16), given a0.
5This relationship and the policy rule (1) imply that in this economy targeting the real exchange rate is
equivalent to targeting the trade balance.
103 Equilibrium dynamics
Before studying the consequences of PPP rules, it will prove instructive to consider a bench-
mark scenario in which the monetary authority pegs the rate of devaluation.
3.1 Equilibrium under a constant devaluation rate
Assume that at t = 0 the central bank announces a monetary policy by which the devaluation
rate is set at a constant level  ∗ for all t. Under this policy speciﬁcation, a perfect-foresight
equilibrium is deﬁned as a pair of sequences {cT
t ,e t}∞
t=0 satisfying (14), (15), and (16), given








Since UT(cT,yN) is a monotone function of cT, it follows that in equilibrium consumption
of tradables must be constant over time, that is, cT
t = cT
t+1 for t ≥ 0. Equation (14) then
implies that the equilibrium level of consumption of tradables, cT







Households consume their permanent income at all times. This unique equilibrium is in
fact Pareto optimal, for cT
t = cT
∗ represents the solution to the problem of maximizing the
representative consumer’s utility function subject to the resource constraints (12) and (14).
As the analysis that follows makes clear, this equilibrium outcome is in sharp contrast with
the ones that may emerge under real exchange rate targeting.
113.2 Equilibrium under real exchange rate targeting
Assume now that the government follows an active PPP rule as described by equation (1),











where n(cT) ≡ h(f(g(cT))) is a strictly increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable function. A
perfect foresight equilibrium is then deﬁned as a sequence {cT
t }∞
t=0, satisfying (14) and (18),
given a0. Obviously, cT
t = cT
∗ ∀t,w i t hcT
∗ given by (17), is a perfect foresight equilibrium.
However, this economy may admit other equilibria in which endogenous variables ﬂuctuate in
response to arbitrary revisions in expectations. This result is formally stated in proposition 1,
which focuses on perfect-foresight equilibria in which all variables remain in a neighborhood












then there exists an inﬁnite number of equilibria {cT
t }∞
t=0 that remain close to cT
∗ and converge,
although not necessarily to cT
∗.
Before presenting the proof of proposition 1, we note that the standard approach to estab-
lishing local indeterminacy consists in examining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of a
linearized version of the equilibrium system. This technique is inappropriate in the economy
under study. The reason is that in small open economies with a single bond and an interest
rate satisfying β(1+r) = 1, the Jacobian of the equilibrium system possesses a unit root. As
a result, there is a breakdown of the theoretical link that ensures that the dynamic properties
of the linearized system are locally identical to those of the original, nonlinear system.6 An
6See, for example, Azariadis, 1993, ch. . 6.
12alternative approach is therefore needed to characterize local dynamics. This is the focal
concern in the proof of proposition 1.
Proof: Condition (19) and the fact that both UT(·,·)a n dn(·)a r eC1 functions imply that
.one can construct an interval I1 ≡ [cT
∗ − α1,c T






















t=0 generated by the second order diﬀerence equation (18) converges to cT.
Moreover, the resulting sequence is bonded by (cT −  (cT),c T +  (cT)). Because I1 is closed





1) ∈ I1 × I1 and |cT
0 − cT
1| <α 2}.N o t et h a tI2 is convex. Clearly, for
any initial condition (cT
0,c T
1) ∈ I2, the diﬀerence equation (18) generates a sequence {cT
t }∞
t=0
that is bounded by I1 and converges. If such sequence satisﬁes equation (14), it constitutes
a perfect foresight equilibrium. One can regard each element of a sequence generated by
equation (18) as a function of the initial condition (cT
0,c T
1), and use the notation cT
t (c0,c 1)
to refer to the t-th element of the sequence. Since both UT(·,·)a n dn(·) are continuous
functions, cT
t (·,·) is also continuous. Take any (cT
0,c T



















1); t ≥ 0
converges uniformly to a continuous function A(cT
0,c T
1)a st →∞(Rudin, 1976, ch. . 7).
Finding an equilibrium then reduces to ﬁnding pairs (cT
0,c T
1) such that A(cT
0,c T
1)=a0. To





∗ − θ)=a0 −
1+r
r








Since A(·,·) is continuous, one can ﬁnd a continuum of scalars φ ∈ (0,α 1 − θ), such that
A(c
T
∗ − θ + φ,c
T
∗ − θ) <a 0 <A (c
T
∗ + θ + φ,c
T
∗ + θ).
Since A(·,·) is continuous, there exists a linear combination of (cT
∗ − θ + φ,cT
∗ − θ)a n d
(cT
∗ + θ + φ,cT
∗ + θ)f o rw h i c hA(·,·) takes the value a0. Since no such linear combination
equals (cT
∗,c T
∗), the equilibrium found is diﬀerent from cT
t = cT
∗ ∀t. Moreover, because
there exists a continuum of values of φ with the properties described above, there exists a
continuum of perfect foresight equilibria.
Condition (19) implies that the possibility of indeterminacy of the perfect foresight equi-
librium is higher the more elastic the PPP rule, the higher the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, the higher the interest rate elasticity of money demand, and the lower the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables. As a way to
provide a feeling for the actual magnitude of the sensitivity of the PPP rule required for
indeterminacy, we set all other parameters at plausible values and solve for the minimum
semielasticity of f for which (19) is satisﬁed. Assume that the period utility function is of
the form U(cT,c N)={[acT 1−1/µ + cN1−1/µ]µ/(µ−1)}1−1/σ/(1 − 1/σ), so that the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution is σ, and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
tradables and nontradables is µ. Assume also that the transactions cost function is of the
form s(x,m)=Ax1+γm−γ, which implies an elasticity of money demand with respect to
i/(1 + i)e q u a lt o−1/(1 + γ). Following Ostry and Reinhart (1992) who use data from
developing countries to estimate the three parameters deﬁning our preference speciﬁcation,
we set σ =0 .44, µ =0 .93, and a =0 .58.7 At the same time we follow Mendoza and Uribe
7The values for σ and µ correspond to the average of the estimates for the Latin America region.
14(2000) and set   = 28 percent per quarter, r =1 .59 percent per quarter, ecT/cN =0 .55,
γ =5 .25, and A =0 .55. Mendoza and Uribe (2000) obtain these ﬁgures using long-run
data relations from the Mexican economy, but similar ﬁgures are obtained for other Latin
American Economies. Under the above parameterization, the model displays indeterminacy
when the semielasticity of the PPP rule, f (e)e, is higher than 1.72 in absolute value. That
is, when in response to a one percent appreciation of the real exchange rate the government
devalues the nominal exchange rate by 1.72 percent or more.
It is worth noting that the equilibrium involving constant consumption (cT
t = cT
∗ ∀t)
Pareto dominates all other equilibria. This is because, as discussed earlier, the steady-state
equilibrium solves the ﬁrst-best problem. Thus, in the present model real exchange rate
targeting is welfare decreasing. We also note that when condition (20) is satisﬁed, not only
does the path of consumption become indeterminate, but also its steady-state level becomes
indeterminate. The indeterminacy of the steady state is a consequence of the unit root built
in small open economy models with incomplete asset markets.
4 Stochastic PPP Rules
The PPP rule studied thus far assumes that the government adjusts the devaluation rate
period by period in its eﬀort to target a given level of real depreciation. In practice, however,
governments adjust the nominal exchange rate more sporadically. More importantly, typi-
cally private agents do not have certainty regarding the timing of devaluations. A natural
question that arises is whether the results obtained in this section regarding the stability of
the macroeconomic equilibrium hold under this more realistic environment.
Suppose that the monetary authority introduces corrective devaluations in response to
deviations of the real exchange rate from target, but that this interventions are random.





f(et) with probability π
¯   with probability 1 − π
(21)
where f is deﬁned as before and ¯   and π ∈ [0,1] are constant parameters. This new PPP
rule is a generalization of the two polar cases considered thus far. In particular, if π =0 ,
then the monetary authority follows a devaluation rate peg. On the other hand, if π =1 ,
the government follows a deterministic PPP rule.
Consider the equilibrium conditions associated with this economy. As in the nonsto-
chastic case, the real exchange rate is linked to aggregate spending by the static relation
(16). The remaining equilibrium conditions are stochastic versions of, respectively, the Euler































(1 + r)j = at, (24)
where k(i) ≡ 1+vx(1, (i)) is strictly increasing in i.
This economy admits an inﬁnite number of equilibria in which consumption and the
nominal interest rate are nonstochastic. To see this, assume that consumption and the
nominal interest rate are indeed nonstochastic. Then, one can rewrite equation (23) using
16(16) and (21) to obtain





























(1 + r)t = a0. (27)
where n(cT) ≡ k(q(cT)). The newly deﬁned function n is not the same as the one deﬁned
under a deterministic PPP rule in the previous section, but it shares the same properties.
In particular, the new function n is increasing and smooth. Therefore, the equilibrium
conditions under a stochastic PPP rule are qualitatively identical to those obtained in the
deterministic case. As a result, we can invoke Proposition 1 to prove that if the function
n is more elastic than the function UT, then there exists an inﬁnite number of equilibria in
which consumption ﬂuctuates deterministically and converges to a steady state. This steady
state will in general diﬀer from the level of consumption associated with the steady-state
equilibrium, cT
∗.
Although on the surface the dynamic properties of this economy look identical to those
associated with the deterministic PPP rule, a number of relevant diﬀerences emerge. First,
the possibility of aggregate instability caused by self-fulﬁlling revisions in expectations now
depends on the perceived probability of intervention π. Speciﬁcally, the larger π,t h el a r g e r
17the elasticity of n and thus the more likely indeterminacy becomes. Second, in the economy
studied here the devaluation rate is a random variable. The distribution of  t is not iid.
The distribution is not identical over time because its mean and variance depend on the
level of the real exchange rate, which is a time-varying variable. Nor is  t independently
distributed, for the level of the real exchange rate in period t>0 depends on the value taken
by this variable in period 0. Finally, the model captures the possibility of expectations-driven
movements in the current account and the trade balance in the absence of actual devaluations.
This property of the model is of empirical interest. For example, in the aftermath of the
Mexican crisis and during the Asian crisis, countries like Argentina and Hong Kong faced
marked movements in aggregate spending and external accounts even though they managed
to maintain their respective exchange rates unaltered.
5S t i c k y P r i c e s
Perhaps the main reason why policymakers engage in real exchange rate targeting is the need
to eliminate the real rigidities that a ﬁxed exchange rate would introduce in an environment
with nominal price rigidities. It is thus clearly in order to extend our benchmark economy
to allow for price stickiness. Accordingly, consider an economy populated by a continuum of
identical inﬁnitely lived households indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Each household is the monopolistic
producer of a diﬀerentiated nontraded good yN
t (j). This good is produced with labor, using
a technology that yields one unit of good per unit of labor. Thus, yN
t (j) denotes both the
quantity of goods produced and the amount of labor supplied by household j in period t.
Each household has preferences deﬁned over sequences of consumption of tradables, cT
t (j),
consumption of nontradables, cN
t (j), and labor eﬀort, yN
t (j). Nominal rigidities are intro-
duced by assuming that each household derives disutility from changing the price of the good





















where U(·,·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable. The function V is assumed to be increasing and convex, and φ is a positive
parameter. The nontraded consumption good is a composite of all of the diﬀerent nontraded















t (j,z) denotes household j s demand for good z in period t.E a c h p e r i o d , t h e
household solves the static problem of minimizing the cost of purchasing the desired amount
of the nontraded composite good. Formally, in period t the household chooses cN
t (j,z)a s































19where Pt is deﬁned by
Pt =






The price index Pt represents the minimum cost of purchasing one unit of the composite
good in period t.



















t(j)+xt(j)+st(j) − τt, (29)
where dc
t(j), md
t(j), and yT denote, respectively, real private debt, real money holdings, and
a constant endowment of tradables. Consumption expenditure, xt(j), and the transaction
















(1 + r)t ≤ 0, (32)
which prevents them from playing Ponzi games.
A key diﬀerence between the model economy developed here and the endowment economy
studied in previous sections is that now the household/ﬁrm unit has the ability to choose
the price of the good it supplies monopolistically. Firms must supply as much output as























t (j)dj denotes the aggregate demand for the nontraded composite good.




t (j), st(j), dc
t(j), Pt(j)}∞
t=0,
so as to maximize (28) subject to (29)-(33). The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with this


















































where λt(j) denotes the marginal utility of wealth of household j in period t,a n dπt(j) ≡
Pt(j)/Pt−1(j)−1 denotes the inﬂation rate of good j in period t. The nominal interest rate,
it, satisﬁes the uncovered interest parity condition (8).
21We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all household/ﬁrm units charge the same
price for the good they produce. Thus, in equilibrium all households are identical. This
means that we can drop the index j. In addition, we have that in equilibrium consumption
of nontradables must equal production of that type of goods, yN
t = cN
t . By deﬁnition, the






Finally, we assume that the government follows a PPP rule of the form given in (1). To
facilitate the analysis, we will assume that the utility function is log-linear in consumption,























































(1 + r)t = a0, (37)
where g(x) ≡ f(1/x)a n dn(x) ≡ 1+vx(1, ((1 + r)(1 + g(x)) − 1)) are strictly increasing
functions, and  (·) is the liquidity preference function deﬁned in equation (9). We can now
provide a formal deﬁnition of a perfect-foresight equilibrium.




22equations (34)-(37), given the initial conditions a0 and cT
−1/cN
−1.
Consider ﬁrst steady-state equilibria. That is, solutions to the system (34)-(37) in which




∗ . Then the triplet (cT
∗,c N
∗ ,π ∗)





































The left hand side of the second equation is strictly decreasing in cN
t whereas the right hand
side is strictly increasing in cN
t . Under the weak assumption that (1 − β)g (∞) >
(θ−1)
φn(∞),a
unique steady-state equilibrium exists. Note that in a steady-state equilibrium consumption
of tradables is identical to that obtained in the ﬂexible-price economy.
Now assume that the government follows a devaluation rate peg. In this case n  =0 .
Then equation (34) implies that cT
t+1 = cT
t ∀t. This result together with the intertemporal
resource constraint (37) imply that cT
t = cT
∗ ≡ ra0/(1+r) for all t. Then equations (35) and
(36) jointly determine the equilibrium paths of πt and cN
t . The following proposition shows
that there exists a unique solution to this system.
Proposition 2 The perfect foresight equilibrium associated with a devaluation rate peg is
locally unique.
Proof: Log-linearizing equations (35) and (36) around π∗ and cN
∗ , we obtain:
ˆ πt+1 = β













βφπ (1 + ηV  )
1+π
2+π > 0a n dηV   ≡ cNV   /V  . A hat on a variable denotes its
log-deviation from its steady-state value. For simplicity, we assume that cT
−1 = cT
∗ .U s i n g
the second equation to eliminate ˆ cN








ˆ πt − γˆ c
N
t−1 (39)
To establish proposition 2, it suﬃces to show that the linear system (38)-(39), describing
the local dynamics of the vector (πt; cN
t ), has a unique solution converging to (π∗,c N
∗ ). The
















Because the system has one predetermined variable, ˆ cN
t−1, and one nonpredetermined variable,
ˆ πt, local uniqueness requires that one eigenvalue of J lies inside the unit circle and the other
outside. Let λ1 and λ2 be the eigenvalues of J. Letting T and D denote the trace and
determinant of J, respectively, we have that λ1 + λ2 = T and λ1λ2 = D.A l s o , T =
1+β−1 + x>2, with x ≡
γπ
1+π > 0, and D = β−1 > 1. Because D>0a n dT>0, the real
parts of both eigenvalues are positive. In addition, because D>1, at least one eigenvalue
lies outside the unit circle. It is also the case that both eigenvalues are real. To establish
this, recall that λ1 and λ2 are the solutions to the quadratic equation 0 = λ2 − Tλ+ D.
Then we must show that T 2 − 4D>0. We have that T 2 =1+2 β−1 + β−2 + x1,w h e r e
x1 ≡ x2+2β−1x+2x>0. Then T 2−4D =1 −2β−1+β−2+x1 =( 1 −β−1)2+x2 > 0. Finally,
suppose that both eigenvalues are greater than 1. Let λ1 denote the smaller eigenvalue. Then
λ1 =( T −
√
T 2 − 4D)/2. Thus, λ1 > 1 implies (T −2)2 >T 2−4D,o rT 2−4T +4 >T 2−4D,
or −4T +4> −4D.T h i si m p l i e st h a t−4 − 4β−1 − 4x +4> −4β−1,o r−4x>0, which is
24a contradiction.
Proposition 2 establishes that endogenous ﬂuctuations near the steady state are impos-
sible when the government pegs the devaluation rate at all times. By contrast, once the
government engages in real exchange rate targeting the possibility of endogenous aggregate
instability emerges. Establishing this possibility is the focus of proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the elasticity of the PPP rule is suﬃciently large, then the perfect fore-




t=0 originating in the neighborhood of the steady-state equi-
librium (cT
∗,c N




Proof: See the appendix.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The characterization of possible channels through which real-exchange-rate targeting aﬀects
the macroeconomy is central to understanding business cycles in emerging economies. This
is because, Calvo et al. (1995) put it, “[b]eing a key relative price in any open economy,
the real exchange rate is probably the most popular real target in developing economies.”
This is particularly the case in Latin America. Calvo et al. provide three examples of actual
episodes of real exchange-rate targeting in this region. An early one is Brazil, where in 1968
the central bank made explicit a rule by which the exchange rate was adjusted as a function
of the diﬀerence between domestic and U.S. inﬂation. Maintaining purchasing power parity
has been at center stage of the Brazilian exchange-rate policy ever since. In Chile, between
1985 and 1992, the government maintained the exchange rate within a band whose trend was
set as a function of the diﬀerence between the previous month’s inﬂation rate and a measure
of average inﬂation in the rest of the world. Colombia, too, followed an explicit PPP rule
between 1986 and 1990.
25On the theoretical front, the main insight of a large existing literature on real exchange
rate targeting, clearly exempliﬁed by Dornbusch (1982), is that in the presence of nominal
frictions PPP rules might facilitate the economy’s adjustment to fundamental shocks.
This paper argues that there is an additional dimension along which exchange rate rules
might introduce real eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, real exchange rate targeting might open the door
to endogenous aggregate ﬂuctuations originating in arbitrary revisions of private agents’
expectations. Moreover, this source of instability is likely to be welfare decreasing. Thus,
governments that stand ready to devalue in response to signs of real overvaluation might
indeed be creating a problem rather than solving one.
Comparing the results of this paper to those of the more traditional literature on PPP
rules, there seems to emerge a tradeoﬀ in the use of the real exchange rate as a policy
target. On the one hand PPP rules can be beneﬁcial because they may act as absorbers of
fundamental shocks, such as innovations in the terms of trade or the world interest rate. On
the other hand, PPP rules might generate unintended consequences by allowing for costly
instability driven by non-fundamental shocks. An interesting extension of this paper would
be, therefore, to evaluate this tradeoﬀ quantitatively in the context of a full ﬂedged general
equilibrium model where both intrinsic and extrinsic sources of uncertainty are accounted
for.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
It will prove convenient to deﬁne wt = cT
t /cN






































(1 + r)t = a0. (43)
The proof is in two steps. First, letting B∗(δ)b ea no p e nb a l li nR3 centered at the steady-
state equilibrium (cT
∗,w ∗,π ∗) with radius δ>0, we show that there is a small enough δ such
that for any constant allocation (cT,w,π) ∈ B∗, one can ﬁnd an inﬁnite number of sequences
{cT
t ,w t,π t}∞
t=0 satisfying (40)-(42) that converge to (cT,w,π) given an initial condition w−1.
We then invoke the technique developed in proposition 1 to argue that an inﬁnite number
of these sequences satisfy the intertemporal resource constraint (43). Thus, such sequences
represent perfect foresight equilibria. Consider ﬁrst the problem of characterizing solutions
to (40)-(42) converging to a ﬁxed triplet (cT,w,π). Clearly, it follows from (40) that such
sequences must satisfy cT
t n(wt+1)=cTn(w), for t ≥ 0. Taking this fact into account, we can
27log-linearize equations (40)-(42) around (cT,w,π) to obtain:






ˆ πt+1 = β
−1ˆ πt − A1(1 + ηV  )ˆ c
T
t +[ A1(1 + ηV  ) − B1ηn]ˆ wt (45)
ˆ wt =ˆ wt−1 +
¯ π
1+¯ π





> 0a n dB1 ≡
(1 + π)(β−1 − 1)
2+π
+ A1 > 0;
we have deﬁned the elasticities ηn ≡ wn (w)/n(w) > 0, ηg ≡ wg (w)/g(w) > 0, and
ηV   = xV   (x)/V  (x) > 0. Using the above three equations to eliminate cT
t from (45) and
rearranging we can write this equation and (46) as
ˆ πt+1 =( A3 + A2B3)ˆ πt + B2B3 ˆ wt−1 (47)










1 − A1(1 + ηV  )ηnA2
, and B3 =
A1(1 + ηV  )ηnB2 + A1(1 + ηV  ) − B1ηn
1 − A1(1 + ηV  )ηnA2
28This is a system of two equations in two unknowns, ˆ πt and ˆ wt. Solutions to this system can
then be used to identify ˆ cT










Because ˆ wt is a predetermined variable in period t while ˆ πt is determined in period t, multiple
solutions of (40)-(42) converging to (cT,w,π)e x i s ti fJ has two eigenvalues lying inside the
unit circle. As the sensitivity of the PPP rule gets large, (i.e., as ηg gets large) both A2 and
B2 converge to zero. This means that one eigenvalue of J converges to zero, and the other
becomes J11 ≡ A3 + B3B2. In turn, as ηg gets large, J11 becomes,
˜ J11 =
β−1 − [(1 + π)(β−1 − 1)(2 + π)−1 + A1]η 
1 − A1(1 + ηV  )η 
,
where η  is implicitly deﬁned by ηn = η ηg. The condition | ˜ J11| < 1 describes the parameter
conﬁgurations under which multiple solutions to (40)-(42) converging to (cT,w,π)e x i s ta s
the sensitivity of the PPP rule gets large. If |J11| < 1f o r( cT,w,π)=( cT
∗,w ∗,π ∗), then,
by continuity |J11| < 1 for any (cT,w,π) ∈ B∗(δ)w i t hδ>0 suﬃciently small. It is now
straightforward to use the arguments developed in Proposition 1 to show that an inﬁnite
number of the sequences converging to a point in B∗ and satisfying (40)-(42) will also satisfy
the transversality condition (43).
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